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ABSTRACT
This article explores whether and to what extent new member states 
of the European Union (EU) seek to pursue their national foreign policy 
goals towards Central Asia through the EU rather than bilaterally. 
To do so, it focuses on Latvia and Romania. While the article finds 
evidence of Romanian attempts to project its interests in the region 
onto the EU level, Latvia appears to rely more extensively on the EU 
level to pursue its goals towards Central Asia. Using insights from the 
literature on Europeanization of national foreign policy, the article 
explains this finding with reference to four variables that determine 
whether a member state will seek to upload its national foreign policy 
preferences onto the EU level, namely the perceived salience of the 
policy goals, the extent to which member states can carve out a niche, 
their perceived capabilities and the level of Europeanization of their 
national foreign policies.
1. Introduction
Research on the involvement of the new member states of the European Union (EU) in the 
EU’s external policies remains very scarce, in particular when it concerns regions beyond 
the Eastern neighbourhood. In contributing to this literature, this article focuses on the 
involvement of two new member states, namely Latvia and Romania, in the EU’s policy 
towards Central Asia.1 In particular, it explores their foreign policy goals towards the region 
and examines to what extent they try to pursue these through the EU rather than bilaterally.
Theoretically, the article draws on insights from the literature on Europeanization (of 
national foreign policies) and European foreign policy analysis. In doing so, it starts from 
three assumptions. To begin with, in the area of foreign policy, Europeanization is generally 
understood as ‘a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and 
sideways) as well as national policies amplified through EU policy (bottom-up projec-
tion)’ (Wong and Hill 2011, 4). While the article is concerned with the latter dimension 
of Europeanization, it assumes that the processes of bottom-up projection (‘uploading’) 
and policy convergence (‘downloading’) exist in a circular relationship (Baun and Marek 
2013, 10; Hill and Wong 2011, 219). Second, the article assumes that member states will 
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2   F. BOSSUYT
attempt to project certain national preferences regarding foreign policy onto the EU level 
because – if successful – it can allow them to pursue and even expand those foreign policy 
objectives beyond those attainable with domestic capabilities (Baun and Marek 2013, 16; 
Hill and Wong 2011, 222; Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 132; Pastore 2013). Third, while 
the national foreign policies of EU member states have each experienced a certain degree 
of Europeanization, the member states’ foreign policies continue to be shaped by traditional 
foreign policy forces of pragmatism, cost-benefit analysis and instrumentalism, both in 
their motivations and their strategic behaviour (Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman 2017). 
As Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman (2017) claim, EU member states directly experience 
‘the tension between the practice of Europeanization and the pull of sovereignty’. Moreover, 
given that the EU’s legal competence in the area of foreign policy is still low, member states 
continue to conduct foreign policy issues in parallel to, separately from, or even in oppo-
sition to the EU.
Starting from these assumptions, the article is interested in exploring whether and to what 
extent new EU member states seek to pursue their national foreign policy goals towards 
Central Asia through the EU rather than bilaterally. Based on insights from the literature on 
Europeanization of national foreign policy (Baun and Marek 2013; Keukeleire and Delreux 
2014, 116–134; Wong and Hill 2011), it identifies four conditions under which member 
states are likely to attempt to project national foreign policy preferences onto the EU level. 
These include the perceived salience of a policy goal, the extent to which member states can 
carve out a niche, member states’ perceived capabilities and the level of Europeanization of 
the national foreign policies. Compared to the top-down dimension of Europeanization, the 
bottom-up dimension has so far received only little attention (Angelescu 2011a; Baun and 
Marek 2013; Denca 2009). Moreover, the focus of existing studies is mostly empirical and is 
geared towards the question of effectiveness of member states’ uploading attempts rather than 
towards the uploading at such. In this context, therefore, the framework presented in this 
article should not be considered as a fully conclusive and exhaustive theoretical account of 
the conditions determining when member states will seek to project national preferences, but 
rather as a heuristic tool developed to help us explore whether and to what extent EU member 
states seek to pursue their national foreign policy goals towards Central Asia through the EU.
Until now, research on the involvement of the new member states in the EU’s external 
policies has focused predominantly on the Eastern neighbourhood (see e.g., Angelescu 
2011b; Copsey and Pomorska 2010; Galbreath 2006; Galbreath and Lamoreaux 2007; 
Kesa 2011; Pisarska 2008; Raik and Gromadzki 2006). As such, there is very little knowl-
edge about their involvement and interests in EU policies towards regions further afield, 
including Central Asia.2 Central Asia stands out as an interesting case, in particular for the 
new member states that were part of the Soviet bloc or Soviet Union. The shared history 
and common economic links create the intuitive expectation that the former communist/
Soviet EU member states will have more pronounced foreign policy goals towards Central 
Asia than the EU member states, which were not part of the Soviet bloc or Soviet Union. 
Moreover, Central Asia poses significant security challenges to Europe – and arguably 
more so to Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic region than to other parts of Europe 
given its closer geographic location and/or logistical links (see e.g., Tiirmaa-Klaar 2006) 
– , including Islamic terrorism, drugs trafficking, organized crime and the risk of regional 
instability due to possible spillover from Afghanistan. Given that these member states’ 
primary foreign policy concerns, including their interest in a closer EU relationship with 
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES  3
the Eastern neighbourhood, are related to security issues (Bilčík 2010; Ozolina and Rostoks 
2006), Central Asia is an interesting case for exploring to what extent security concerns 
also inform their interests in the EU’s foreign and development policies towards regions 
beyond the Eastern neighbourhood.
The article focuses on two new member states: Latvia and Romania. Compared to other 
new EU member states, Latvia and Romania have relatively strong ties with Central Asia 
(Gower 2010; Jēkabsone 2013; Marin 2013). Therefore, we can expect that – compared to 
other new member states, which have less developed relations with and less outspoken 
interests in the region – Latvia and Romania are more likely to actively use the EU level in 
pursuit of their policy goals towards Central Asia. This means that if we do not find evidence 
of Latvian and Romanian attempts to project their national interests in Central Asia onto 
the EU level, we can assume that other new member states will also not attempt to influence 
the EU’s policy towards Central Asia.3 However, as will be shown below, Latvia has even 
more pronounced interests in the region than Romania, which suggests that it is likely to 
be more active than Romania at the EU level.
At the same time, bearing in mind Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman (2017) conceptu-
alization of EU member states’ national foreign policy as manifesting a tension between 
Europeanization and sovereign imperatives, we expect Latvia and Romania to also under-
take foreign policy action towards Central Asia in parallel to or autonomously from (their 
involvement in) EU policy, in particular in policy areas where they perceive to have the 
capacities and resources to ‘go it alone’.
Methodologically, the article relies on data gathered through document analysis of official 
documents from the EU and from the Romanian and Latvian governments, complemented 
with insights from, on the one hand, semi-structured interviews with EU and national 
officials, and secondary sources, including academic literature and publications from think 
tanks, on the other.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the 
analytical framework is presented along with the theoretical assumptions that underpin 
the analysis in the empirical sections. To do so, this section draws on the literature on 
Europeanization of national foreign policy and European foreign policy analysis. In the next 
section, we outline the interests and policy goals of Latvia and Romania towards Central 
Asia, and review their diplomatic, political, economic and cultural relations with the five 
Central Asian states. Next, the article analyzes the extent to which Latvia and Romania 
seek to project their interests in the region onto the EU level. In doing so, it also explores 
which goals they pursue in parallel to or independently of (their involvement in) EU policy. 
This section ends by offering some tentative explanations by making reference to the four 
conditions under which member states are likely to engage in uploading. The final section 
summarizes the main findings and provides some broader reflections, first, on what these 
findings tell us about the new member states as foreign policy entrepreneurs and, second, 
on how the findings can be used for further research.
2. Between Europeanization and nationalization
2.1. Uploading in order to amplify
The article starts from the assumption that EU member states will seek to project or 
‘upload’ certain national foreign policies objectives onto the EU level because of the possible 
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4   F. BOSSUYT
‘amplifying’ effect. Bottom-up Europeanization in the area of foreign policy may enable 
‘member states to pursue and even expand foreign policy objectives (in specific regions 
or with regard to specific themes) beyond those attainable with domestic capabilities’ 
(Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 132). If a state successfully manages to upload a national 
foreign policy goal onto the EU level, it can rely on budgetary, diplomatic and economic sup-
port from the EU institutions and other member states, which allows this national foreign 
policy goal to be pursued more intensively and with a higher potential impact (Keukeleire 
and Delreux 2014, 132; also see Hill and Wong 2011, 222). In this regard, the article thus 
takes a rational institutionalist approach in the sense that it assumes EU member states to 
act strategically to attain their preferences.
While it is generally acknowledged that EU foreign policy is highly subject to the interests 
of the large member states (in particular, Germany, France and the UK), smaller member 
states can also leave their mark on the EU’s foreign policy and succeed in projecting their 
interests onto the EU level (Denca 2009, 2013; Nasra 2011; Pastore 2013; Wong and Hill 
2011, 7). EU membership allows them to pursue a more ambitious national foreign policy, 
backed by the EU’s political and economic weight and international standing (Denca 2009; 
Popescu 2010). Smaller member states also benefit strongly from the increased access to 
information and resources, which hugely exceed their own capabilities (Denca 2009, 402). 
As such, new member states, and in particular the smaller countries, tend to perceive EU 
membership and integration in the field of foreign policy as carrying more benefits than 
losses.
The foreign policy priorities of the new EU member states mostly concern relations 
with their immediate neighbours and/or countries situated in their relative vicinity (Baun 
and Marek 2013). As such, the main geographic priorities of most new member states are 
the Eastern neighbouring countries of the EU and/or the countries of the Western Balkans 
(see e.g., Bilčík 2010, 135). These priorities are clearly reflected in their involvement in the 
EU foreign policy-making process, as these member states tend to be most active in the 
EU policy issues relating to those two regions. The observation that the new member states 
have been attempting to project their interests onto the EU level, suggests that they have 
moved beyond their respective accession legacies (Baun and Marek 2013). After a decade 
of institutional adaptation to the workings of the EU foreign policy-making process, most 
new member states now master the Brussels game and do not shy away from playing along 
with the older member states (Baun and Marek 2013; Bilčík 2010; Pastore 2013; Vilpisauskas 
2011). Both in light of the economic crisis and the pressures of globalization and as a result 
of ‘top-down’ Europeanization, many of the new member states are in the process of further 
redefining their national foreign policy, manifesting an increased interest in bolstering ties 
with countries and regions beyond their immediate vicinity. As mentioned above, however, 
the extent to which they are attempting to do so through the EU rather than bilaterally has 
so far received little scholarly attention.
2.2. Continued centrality of national sovereignty
At the same time, most of the new member states – like many other member states – are 
opposed to deeper EU integration in the area of foreign policy and prefer this domain to 
remain intergovernmental. This points to the continued centrality of national sovereignty as 
the guiding principle for foreign policy. As Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman (2017) assert, 
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES  5
EU member states directly experience ‘the tension between the practice of Europeanization 
and the pull of sovereignty’. Foreign policy-making in the European capitals is still informed 
by demands of national decision-makers to follow sovereign imperatives in as many areas 
as possible, both procedurally and in terms of substance. In this perspective, national for-
eign policy is thus the result of a reconciliation of sovereign imperatives, which ‘explain 
the enduring pragmatism and even obstructivism that characterizes many member states’ 
foreign policy’ (Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman 2017).
Moreover, as the EU’s legal competence in the area of foreign policy is still low, member 
states continue to conduct foreign policy issues in parallel to, separately from, or even in 
opposition to the EU. Based on this conceptualization, member states’ foreign policy should 
thus be observed across the interface of forces of Europeanization and national imperatives 
(Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman 2017). The extent to which national sovereign impera-
tives operate in foreign policy is different in all 28 member states and varies on a policy by 
policy basis (Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman 2017).
National preferences and interests of EU member states are shaped by a broad range of 
factors, including (perceived) size, geography, economy, historical experience, domestic pol-
itics, institutional settings – such as coordination of EU policy-making – , external alliances, 
international developments and perceived national vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Bilčík 
2010; Copsey and Haughton 2009; Wong and Hill 2011). As Wong and Hill (2011, 3) point 
out, national preferences and interests also ‘reflect a country’s sense of national identity, 
including its basic values and perceptions of what it stands for in the world’. In the case of 
the EU member states that were part of the Soviet bloc or Soviet Union, national preferences 
and interests in the area of foreign policy are strongly influenced by the experience of and 
the security and economic dependencies from the communist and Soviet era, as well as by 
the political geography of the countries’ historical statehood (Bilčík 2010, 142; Copsey and 
Haughton 2009; Vilpišauskas 2011).
In examining to what extent Latvia and Romania pursue their foreign policy goals 
towards Central Asia through the EU rather than bilaterally, these factors thus need to be 
taken into account. Therefore, we might find some variation in the degree to which Latvia 
and Romania each use the EU level to pursue their interests in Central Asia not only because 
Latvia’s interests are more pronounced than those of Romania, but also given the variation 
that they display on a number of these preference-shaping factors, including history and 
geography. To begin with, although they both are former socialist states and they share a 
recent transition from socialist and authoritarian states to democratic and modern lib-
eral states, Latvia and Romania have different historical trajectories and experiences with 
statehood. Latvia was part of the Soviet Union and only regained its independence as a 
sovereign state in 1991. Romania was a USSR satellite state, but although it fell under the 
influence sphere of Moscow, it assumed a bit of a ‘dissident’ position within the Soviet bloc 
and enjoyed more autonomy compared to the other USSR satellite states. Second, although 
they are both geostrategically located countries – an asset which they both want to take full 
advantage of – , they have a different geographical location. Latvia is situated in northern 
Europe, next to the Baltic Sea, while Romania is located in Central Eastern Europe, next 
to the Black Sea. Third, they differ in size. Romania is the second largest new EU member 
state, after Poland, and tends to be regarded as a medium-sized country, while Latvia is 
one of the smallest EU member states. However, it should be noted that Romania, given 
its limited resources and Gross Domestic Product per capita, is sometimes approached as 
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6   F. BOSSUYT
a small state (see e.g., Malova et al. 2010).4 Finally, they have a different accession history. 
Latvia joined the EU in 2004 while Romania became a member in 2007.
2.3. Conditions for uploading
Based on insights from the literature on Europeanization of national foreign policy, the 
article identifies four conditions under which member states are likely to attempt to project 
national foreign policy preferences onto the EU level. A first condition pertains to the per-
ceived importance of a policy goal. Member states will normally only try to project national 
preferences onto the EU when these concern issues that they consider very important (Baun 
and Marek 2013, 213, 218). In other words, if an issue is not considered a policy priority, 
they will not invest significant effort in trying to influence the EU on that matter. The factors 
determining the (perceived) importance of a policy issue are of course closely linked to the 
preference-shaping factors mentioned above.
Second, attempts at uploading tend to occur when member states have carved out a 
niche for themselves, a policy area or issue on which they can provide specific expertise or 
experience (Baun and Marek 2013, 16, 212, 213, 218, 219).
Third, the extent to which member states will pursue national foreign policy goals 
through the EU depends on their perceived capabilities. Attempts at uploading are more 
likely when member states feel they cannot do it alone and that their interests will be better 
served when going through the EU (Baun and Marek 2013, 223; Keukeleire and Delreux 
2014, 132; Wong and Hill 2011). This condition is of course particularly salient for smaller 
member states, as they have limited domestic resources and capacities (see e.g., Pastore 2013)
A fourth and final condition regards the level of Europeanization of the member states’ 
national foreign policies. The more their foreign policies – including the governmental 
structure, bureaucracy and organizational infrastructure of their foreign policy machinery 
– are adapted to the EU’s foreign policy (i.e., downloading dimension of Europeanization), 
the more likely they are to attempt to project national foreign policies objectives onto the 
EU level (Baun and Marek 2013, 11, 222, 223). This condition strongly reflects the assump-
tion that the bottom-up and top-down dimensions of Europeanization exist in a circular 
relationship (see above).
In what follows, the article first outlines Latvia’s and Romania’s interests and foreign pol-
icy goals towards Central Asia, before examining whether and to what extent they pursue 
these interests and goals through the EU rather than bilaterally. The data examined cover 
the period 2008–2017, with most attention focused on the last five years (2013–2017).
3. Latvian and Romanian interests in Central Asia
Both Latvia and Romania have a strong diplomatic presence in the region and maintain 
relatively well-established and long-lasting relations with the Central Asian states, in particu-
lar with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the three largest and most important 
countries in the region. While their diplomatic relations with the Central Asian states go 
back to the early days of the latter’s independence, their ties with the region have inten-
sified in recent years. The outline of their interests and policy objectives towards Central 
Asia presented below shows that Latvia’s interests in Central Asia are wider and more pro-
nounced than those of Romania. In the period 2012–2015, Central Asia was mentioned 
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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES  7
as a priority region in Latvia’s foreign policy strategy, alongside the EU’s Eastern neigh-
bourhood (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 2016a). As we will see below, this 
coincided with the preparation and implementation of Latvia’s Presidency of the Council 
of the EU. Although Central Asia has now taken a back seat to the Eastern Partnership in 
Latvia’s foreign policy, the region still attracts considerable attention from Latvia (Latvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017; Pastore 2017). In Romania’s foreign policy, up until now, 
Central Asia has not been considered a priority and has received relatively little attention 
(Romanian Government 2009, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017b). Nevertheless, 
Romania has considerable interests in the region (Gower 2010, 42; Interview 1), stemming 
to a large extent from its ambition to take maximum use of its geostrategic location within 
the Black Sea region (Romanian Government 2009; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2014). Latvia’s increased interest in Central Asia is motivated mainly by security and eco-
nomic reasons. Romania’s interests in Central Asia are mostly economic and energy related. 
Security concerns also play a role, but to a lesser extent than in the case of Latvia.
3.1. Romania’s interests in Central Asia
Romania is mainly focused in the region on expanding its relationships with Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Its interest in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is marginal, for the 
pragmatic reason that these countries have little to offer. Kazakhstan is its closest and main 
partner in Central Asia. The relationship is of strategic importance to Romania (Interview 1; 
Marin 2013, 2). The principal area of cooperation between the two states is the energy sector 
and derived industries (Gower 2010, 43; Interview 1. The considerable economic stakes and 
long-standing diplomatic ties also translate in close political support. For instance, Romania 
was a strong supporter of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010 (Gower 2010, 43; Marin 2013, 2), as well as of its 
bid to host the international exhibition ‘Expo 2017’ (Marin 2013, 2).
Romania is drawn to Central Asia’s market potential, which offers opportunities for 
Romanian exports of industrial products and for Romanian know-how in the field of 
hydrocarbons, drilling equipment and land improvement (Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2014, 2017a). Although significantly expanded in recent years, Romanian exports 
to Kazakhstan – its main trade partner in the region – remain low (84.3 million US dol-
lar in 2014) and consist mainly of electromechanical equipment (31.6%), steel (16.3%), 
chemical products (13.6%), transport vehicles (11.5%), food products (8.8%) and wood 
(8.8%) (Embassy of Romania in the Republic of Kazakhstan 2017a). By contrast, Romanian 
imports from Kazakhstan are quite high, amounting to more than 3 billion US dollar in 
2014 (Embassy of Romania in the Republic of Kazakhstan 2017a). As a net oil importer 
and an important oil processing market, Romania is one of the Kazakhstan’s largest export 
markets and top FDI destinations (Marin 2013, 2). Because the Kazakh state oil company 
KazMunaiGas owns the Romanian company Rompetrol, Kazakhstan is one of the largest 
contributors to Romania’s national budget, providing revenues of more than €1.5 billion a 
year (Marin 2013, 2). This shows that Central Asian countries should no longer be seen as 
passive entities, submitted to the agency of external actors (Cooley 2012).
Energy interests are the main driving factor behind Romania’s closer engagement with 
Central Asia. They also drive its relations with Turkmenistan, its second partner in Central 
Asia. Together with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan plays an important role in realizing Romania’s 
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8   F. BOSSUYT
ambition to become the main energy and transport hub in the Black Sea region. Romania 
wants to take full advantage of its potential as a key access route to the European market for 
Caspian Sea energy resources (Romanian Government 2009; Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2014, 2017b), a position which it can play it out against both its European partners 
and its Central Asian partners. Hence, Romania is one of the main supporters of the estab-
lishment of a Trans-Caspian corridor to transport Caspian Sea gas to Europe, the so-called 
Southern Corridor, which would help to diversify gas transit routes and thus reduce Europe’s 
dependence on Russian gas (Interview 1; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 2017b).
However, the ‘relative’ vicinity of Central Asia to the Black Sea region also holds a secu-
rity risk for Romania, in the sense that potential instability in Central Asia could affect 
Romania’s energy security. Other security threats for Romania include illegal migration, 
terrorism and drugs trafficking, notably from Afghanistan. Moreover, as is the case for 
almost all new member states, Afghanistan and the NATO mission there were an important 
foreign policy issue for Romania. Since possible instability in Afghanistan may spill over to 
the Central Asian states, Romania has an interest in contributing to the country’s ‘security 
climate needed for stabilization and reconstruction activities’ and therefore also participates 
in NATO’s post-ISAF activities in Afghanistan (Romania’s Permanent Delegation to NATO’s 
2017). Central Asia is only a minor beneficiary of Romanian aid and is not considered a 
priority region for Romanian development cooperation. Some technical assistance has been 
offered to the region, namely in the areas of water management and diplomacy training, 
but most of it has been channelled through the EU and UNDP (RoAid 2016; Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012).
3.2. Latvia’s interests in Central Asia
For Latvia, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and its gradual phasing-out was a major foreign 
policy issue (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, 2013; Pastore 2016). Like Romania, 
Latvia considers NATO membership as the foundation for its national security (Jēkabsone 
2013; Ozolina and Rostoks 2006; Tiirmaa-Klaar 2006). Hence, it fully supports NATO’s pol-
icy and concerns towards Afghanistan and, by extension, Central Asia. However, compared 
to Romania, there are more interests at stake for Latvia. Apart from participating in the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, Latvia was a leading actor in NATO’s 
cargo traffic to Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which ran 
from the Baltic ports overland and by air to Afghanistan. Latvia acted as an entry point 
for both an air supply line and a rail supply line. The latter went across Russia and Central 
Asia, thereby taking advantage from the railway infrastructure and networks that were 
established in the Soviet era. Moreover, Latvia’s embassies in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
– whose territories have been used by NATO for transit from and to Afghanistan – func-
tioned as ‘NATO Contact Point Embassies’ to support NATO transit activities (Interview 4; 
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The NDN held considerable economic benefits 
for Latvia, especially for the transport and logistics industry operating in and around the 
sea ports and Riga’s international airport (Interview 4; Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2012, 2013). Before Russia decided to close the NDN in 2015, Latvia even hoped that the 
transport corridor would also be used for commercial cargos after the end of ISAF (Interview 
4).5 Since 2015, Latvia has been participating in NATO’s support mission for Afghanistan’s 
national security forces (Vanaga 2017).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
sto
n U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
5:2
0 1
0 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES  9
Latvia also has other security concerns relating to Central Asia. Latvia is witnessing 
increasing cases of drugs trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime and illegal migra-
tion all coming from Central Asia through Russia. Therefore, Latvia has a direct interest in 
improving border management and drugs control capacities in the region (Interview 2).
Apart from contributing to security and stability in Central Asia, Latvia hopes to 
strengthen its economic presence there. Despite its very different political and economic 
trajectory since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvia maintains well-established polit-
ical relations with the Central Asian states and enjoys a very positive image in the region 
(Interview 2, Interview 4). Its bilateral relations with the countries are mostly centred on 
strengthening economic cooperation (Pastore 2017). Like Romania, bilaterally, Latvia’s main 
interest lies with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as these countries have most 
economic potential.
Since a couple of years, Latvia has been offering development assistance to the region, in 
particular to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the two poorest countries (Jēkabsone 2013; Latvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2017). While its funding for development 
cooperation is very limited due to budgetary restraints, Latvia is committed to providing 
assistance to the region ‘in areas where there is demand for Latvian expertise’ (Latvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 14). In Central Asia, Latvia mostly offers technical assis-
tance for border and customs control, but also for food security and local governance 
(Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014a, 2017). Previously, like in Romania, Latvian 
development cooperation focused predominantly on the Eastern Partnership countries (in 
particular, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia) and on Afghanistan. However, with 
Central Asia having become a new priority for Latvia’s foreign policy, the region has now 
been added as a priority region for Latvian development assistance. Latvia openly concedes 
that ‘development cooperation is an important foreign policy tool, which is especially impor-
tant to Latvia in its foreign policy priority regions: the Eastern Partnership and Central 
Asian countries’ (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 14).
In addition, Latvia has been actively seeking to attract students from Central Asia. The 
number of Central Asians among the foreign student population in Latvian universities 
is very high, with currently no less than 800 students from Uzbekistan alone (Interview 4; 
Pastore 2016). Riga School of Law offers a European law and economics study programme 
specifically for citizens from the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership and Central 
Asian countries (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016b; Pastore 2016).
Latvia is very interested in further developing its potential as a transport hub for Chinese 
and Central Asian exports. Already since Soviet times, Latvia’s sea ports have been a central 
transit base for exports from Central Asia to Europe. Today, logistics and transit services 
continue to be the main area of Latvia’s economic cooperation with Central Asia because 
of their common (railway) transportation infrastructure. Most of Uzbekistan’s cotton 
exports to Europe, for instance, passes through the port of Riga (Interview 2; Interview 
4). Kazakhstan has a transit terminal near the port of Ventspils for its export of grain to 
Europe (Peyrouse 2009, 9)6 and Tajikistan uses the port of Riga for the transit of its alu-
minium exports to Europe (Interview 2). As with Romania, Kazakhstan is Latvia’s main 
trade partner in Central Asia. While trade with Kazakhstan is dominated by the imports 
of oil, it is less so than in the case of Romania, even though trade between Kazakhstan and 
Latvia remains very limited; in 2015, exports amounted to €42 million and imports to €11 
million (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2017). Latvia has been increasingly eager to 
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expand trade relations and explore new business opportunities in Kazakhstan as well as in 
the other countries, including in the fields of technology transfer, agriculture, pharmaceu-
ticals, metalwork, tourism and education (Jēkabsone 2013, 1, 2; Latvian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2013; Pastore 2017, 152).
In view of China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, Latvia is also increasingly positioning 
itself as a potential overland gateway in northern Europe for Chinese exports (Pastore 
2017, 152). Despite Latvia’s strong dependence on Russian gas supplies (Mišík 2010, 124), 
the country does not have a direct interest in the construction of alternative energy supply 
routes from Central Asia via the Caspian to Europe, simply because it is unlikely that these 
pipelines would be able to supply the Baltic region.
4. Uploading of national interests
Since their accession to the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively, both Latvia and Romania 
have become more involved in Central Asia. To some extent, this might be the result of 
the top-down impact of their participation in the EU foreign policy-making process. To a 
larger extent, however, this is linked to the strategic shifts and reorientation process of their 
foreign policy in the aftermath of their dual accession to the EU and NATO. Indeed, prior 
to their accession to these organizations, Latvia and Romania’s foreign policy was entirely 
dedicated to achieving membership. It is only after their accession that they started to (re-)
conceptualize their role in their non-EU neighbourhood and to identify their new national 
interests (Angelescu 2011b; Kesa 2011; Micu 2010; Pastore 2013). This reorientation of their 
foreign policy also pushed them to find a niche for themselves within the EU’s foreign policy, 
which would reflect their expertise and interests (Galbreath 2006, 122, 123; Kesa 2011, 87; 
Popescu 2010).7 In what follows, we explore to what extent both countries have sought to 
pursue their foreign policy goals towards Central Asia through the EU.
4.1. Latvia
Since 2013, Central Asia has been singled out by Latvia as a priority for EU foreign pol-
icy, which it now considers almost equally important as the Eastern Partnership (Latvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013; Pastore 2016). Previously, Central Asia was given much 
less attention in Latvia’s agenda for EU foreign policy (Jēkabsone 2013; Latvian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2012). This policy change is undoubtedly related to Latvia holding the 
Rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2015, which required the 
country to think strategically about the goals it wants achieve through the EU. Moreover, 
although the abilities of the Presidency to exert influence on EU decision-making have been 
reduced with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, especially in the area of external pol-
icies, recent research on Poland’s Council Presidency and its actions regarding the Eastern 
Partnership has shown that the incumbent can still be an influential actor in EU deci-
sion-making on external policies, especially when it comes to agenda-setting (Vandecasteele, 
Bossuyt, and Orbie 2013). In this regard, it is interesting to observe that Latvia set some 
ambitious goals concerning Central Asia in its Council Presidency agenda, namely to revi-
talize the EU strategy for Central Asia, which was adopted by the Council in 2007 (Council 
of the European Union 2007), and to make sure that the EU’s development assistance to the 
region is more in tune with its political strategy (Interview 2; Latvian Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs 2014b). At a more concrete level, Latvia aspired to use the occasion of its Council 
Presidency to move the EU’s Central Asia policy forward in areas of ‘border security, coun-
ter-terrorism operations, WTO membership of Central Asian countries, strengthening of 
economic ties with Afghanistan, education, water resource management, energy efficiency 
and the building of a civil society’ (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 10). The strong 
commitment to Central Asia in Latvia’s Presidency agenda reflects above all the country’s 
security interests in the region. This is explicitly mentioned in the 2012 annual report of 
Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
In view of a gradual transfer of responsibility in Afghanistan to the Government of that country, 
and the engagement of Latvia in Afghanistan and a broader Central Asian region, the Latvian 
Presidency, by putting to use the EU Strategy for Central Asia and instruments for coopera-
tion with Afghanistan, wishes to raise the profile of the region within the foreign policy of the 
European Union in the matters of security, economy and energy issues. (Latvian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2012, 21, 22)
Latvia’s urge to revitalize the EU’s strategy for Central Asia also drew on the acknowledge-
ment that the geostrategic environment of the region has evolved since 2007, with increased 
instability risks due to NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, China’s growing influence 
and Russia’s strong interest in maintaining control over the region (Pastore 2016, 5).
In trying to upload its national interests concerning Central Asia to the EU level, the 
Latvian Presidency mainly relied on two channels, both of which reveal the extent to which 
Latvia has familiarized itself with the formal and informal policy-making processes in 
Brussels. First, it teamed up with Germany – considered the main player in the field of 
EU–Central Asia relations – in taking a leading role in the 2015 review of the EU’s strategy 
for Central Asia (Interview 1; Interview 3; Interview 4; Pastore 2016, 8). Alliance-building 
is a commonly used strategy in EU foreign policy (see e.g., Copsey and Pomorska 2014; 
Miskimmon 2007, 12). As a small and arguably insignificant member state, forming an 
alliance with the country that is by far the most influential member state when it comes 
to EU–Central Asia relations was clearly a strategic and well-calculated move. Second, 
the Latvian Presidency organized a variety of different level events in Brussels and Latvia 
and in European and Central Asian capitals with the aim of raising the profile of Central 
Asia among its fellow member states (Interview 1; Interview 3, Interview 4; Pastore 2016). 
Among other things, it organized an EU–Central Asia forum in Latvia on clean technologies 
and sustainable development, a conference in Brussels on the future of EU–Central Asia 
cooperation, a lab debate at the 2015 European Development Days in Brussels on women’s 
economic rights in Central Asia and an EU–Central Asia ministerial meeting in Riga on 
education.8
Although Central Asia is currently no longer singled out as a key foreign policy priority in 
Latvia’s foreign policy, the Latvian Government remains committed to ‘continue highlighting 
the geopolitical significance of the Central Asian region and keep the region’s theme high 
on the EU agenda, as well as running cooperation projects both bilaterally and under EU 
programmes’ (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017, 17; also see Pastore 2017).
Latvia admits that it seeks to utilize EU foreign policy mechanisms and instruments 
for Central Asia to pursue some of its foreign policy goals towards Central Asia, because 
it does not have the resources and capacities needed to pursue these goals on its own 
(Interview 2; Interview 4). Therefore, it actively seeks to influence the EU’s agenda, and 
contributes to the implementation of the EU’s policy by seconding national experts in 
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those areas where it has a specific interest and expertise. Latvia, for instance, is very active 
in the EU’s border management programme in Central Asia (BOMCA),9 in which it has 
trained Central Asian border guards and customs officers since 2007 (Interview 4; Latvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 10; 2017, 17). In 2015–2018, it plays the lead role among 
the EU member states in implementing the programme (Latvian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2017, 17; Pastore 2016, 11). Latvia is also actively engaged in the EU’s Central 
Asia Education Platform (CAEP), which aims at strengthening education reforms in the 
region (Interview 4; Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017, 17). Apart from hosting the 
EU–Central Asia ministerial meeting on education during its 2015 Council Presidency, 
the Latvian Government committed itself to assuming a leading role in the Vocational 
Education and Training component of the CAEP. In this regard, for instance, it organized 
the CAEP Regional Conference on National Qualifications Framework in 2016.10 Latvia 
has also been involved in EU projects on food security, which aim at approximating food 
standards in the region with EU standards. Latvia is increasingly keen to offer its transition 
and reform experience to contribute to the implementation of EU assistance programmes 
in Central Asia, as it has been doing for EU programmes in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova 
(Jēkabsone 2013, 2). In acknowledging that it has an important role to play in exemplifying 
to the post-Soviet states how a country can make it through de-Sovietization, democrati-
zation and marketization, Latvia has found an important niche for itself within EU foreign 
policy (see also Andrespok and Kasekamp 2012, 124; Galbreath 2006, 122, 123; Galbreath 
and Lamoreaux 2007, 116; Pastore 2016).
The biggest asset of the EU’s policy towards Central Asia according to Latvia is that the EU 
offers regional cooperation, which has the best scope for dealing with cross-border issues, 
such as border control and water management (Interview 2). It is particularly in these – ‘soft 
security’ – areas that Latvia feels it is important to work with the EU because it is unable to 
address these issues on its own. Conversely, at the bilateral level of its relations with Central 
Asia, Latvia feels it has enough capacities to pursue certain goals on its own, which implies 
that part of its foreign policy towards Central Asia is conducted in parallel with or separately 
from the EU, in particular in the sphere of economic cooperation (Jēkabsone 2013; Latvian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, 2013; Pastore 2017).
4.2. Romania
The fact that Romania’s interests in Central Asia are less strong and pronounced com-
pared to those of Latvia, is reflected in its involvement in the EU policy-making process, 
which is noticeably lower. The area where Romania has been most active at the EU level is 
the energy security domain, and in particular concerning the Trans-Caspian pipeline and 
Nabucco (Interview 1; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 2014, 2017b). Romania 
has invested considerable effort in lobbying other EU member states and institutional actors 
in order to get EU support for these projects (Micu 2010, 84). However, Romania has also 
pursued these goals bilaterally, in parallel with actions undertaken at the EU level (Interview 
1; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). For instance, Romania has had several 
meetings with Turkmenistan in the last few years, which all focused largely on securing 
access to Turkmenistan’s gas reserves and on overcoming some of the political problems 
surrounding the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline (Eurasianet 2011, 2012). The 
Romanian Government openly admits that it is pursuing this dual track – i.e., acting on 
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both the EU and the bilateral level – in pursuit of its strategic policy goal to become a major 
energy transport corridor between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea areas (Interview 1; 
Romanian Government 2009).
Related to this, the Romanian Government would like to see more approximation in 
Central Asia with EU rules and practices, and in particular in the areas of transport, energy 
and environment. Therefore, Romania has also been pushing the EU level to establish closer 
institutional links between the Eastern Partnership and Central Asia (Interview 1; Interview 
3). It has done so mainly at meetings of COEST, i.e., the preparatory Council meetings for 
issues relating to eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, where it has been actively calling 
on the EU to include Central Asian countries more in the mechanisms and instruments 
operational for the Eastern Partnership countries, such as TAIEX.11
Romania also wishes to contribute to the implementation of EU assistance initiatives in 
Central Asia, in particular in areas where it has specific expertise. Like Latvia, Romania does 
not have sufficient resources to provide extensive development assistance at the bilateral 
level. Seconding experts to the EU level is therefore an appealing alternative (Interview 1). 
In Central Asia, Romania contributes mainly to the EU’s Water Initiative. Next to providing 
expert knowledge on water management at the project level (Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2012), it acts as chair of the ‘Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia’ (EECCA) 
working group of the EU Water Initiative, which works together with the EU programme 
‘Regional Environment Programme for Central Asia’ (EURECA).12 The working group 
deals with issues of water supply and sanitation, as well as management of cross-border 
water resources.
Like Latvia, Romania prefers to pursue its economic interests in Central Asia fully 
separately from the EU and has been conducting an active economic diplomacy in the 
region (Embassy of Romania in Kazakhstan 2017a; Marin 2013). Similarly, in the higher 
education sphere, it has negotiated bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, offering scholarships to students from these countries to study at Romanian 
high education institutes (Marin 2013, 3, 4; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017a). 
Turkmenistan is even one of the main recipients of Romanian scholarships (RoAid 2017). 
In the academic year 2015–2016, Romania offered no less than 132 scholarships to Turkmen 
students (Embassy of Romania in Kazakhstan 2017b). However, Romania is also actively 
involved in the EU’s higher education initiatives in the region, namely Erasmus Plus and 
Tempus.
It is interesting to note that Latvia’s efforts to bring more attention to Central Asia under 
its Council Presidency did not go unnoticed in Bucharest and were positively received by 
Romanian diplomats. In this regard, some social learning seems to have occurred in the 
sense that Romania has come to appreciate Latvia’s approach – the combination of teaming 
up with an important member state and organizing a variety of different level events – and 
considers it as an example to be followed when they assume the Presidency of the Council 
in 2019 (Interview 1).
4.3. Tentative explanations
We end this section by offering some tentative explanations for the findings presented above. 
In doing so, we fall back on the four conditions we identified under which member states 
are likely to project national preferences onto the EU level (see Table 1).
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How can we explain that Latvia has been more active at the EU level than Romania? 
From the analysis presented above, it is clear that Latvia scores ‘better’ on all four conditions 
than Romania. First, Latvia’s stronger involvement at the EU level is connected to the fact 
that its interests in Central Asia are broader and more pronounced than those of Romania. 
Latvia has now even singled out Central Asia as a priority region for its foreign policy (cf. 
condition 1). Romania also has significant stakes in the region, but not to the extent that 
the region is prioritized in its foreign policy. Second, both Latvia and Romania seek to par-
ticipate in EU policy towards Central Asia in those areas where they have specific expertise 
(including in the areas of border management and water management, respectively) (cf. 
condition 2) and where they lack the capacities and resources to ‘go it alone’ (cf. condition 
3). Given their limited resources to offer bilateral development and technical assistance, 
providing this expertise through the EU is perceived by them as being more advantageous. 
However, these factors play out stronger in the case of Latvia, which – unlike Romania – 
has immediate historical links with Central Asia. Having gone through a triple transition 
of de-Sovietization, democratization and marketization, the country seeks to capitalize on 
the notion that it is uniquely disposed to cooperate with Central Asia and to contribute its 
transition expertise to EU projects in the region (cf. condition 2). A final explanation can be 
found in the countries’ different accession history. Latvia has joined the EU in 2004, giving 
it three years more time than Romania to adapt its domestic foreign policy machinery to 
EU foreign policy and to ‘mature’ as an EU foreign policy entrepreneur (cf. condition 4). 
In this context, also the fact that Latvia held the Council Presidency in the first half of 2015 
plays a major role to the extent that this required the country to think strategically about 
the goals it wishes to pursue through the EU. This raises the question whether Central Asia 
would have occupied such a central place among Latvia’s current priorities regarding EU 
foreign policy if the country had not been holding the Council Presidency in 2015. With 
Romania assuming the Council Presidency only in 2019, it remains to be seen whether the 
prospect of holding the Council Presidency will have a similar effect on the (re)formulation 
of its foreign policy priorities.
5. Conclusion
This article has focused on the involvement of new member states in the EU’s policy towards 
Central Asia. In particular, it has explored Latvia and Romania’s foreign policy goals towards 
the region and examined to what extent they try to pursue these goals through the EU rather 
Table 1. conditions determining the likelihood of uploading to eu level, applied to latvia and romania.
Latvia Romania
condition 1 perceived salience of a policy goal central asia singled out as foreign 
policy priority (in 2012–2015)
Significant stakes in central 
asia, but not a foreign policy 
priority
condition 2 carving out a niche •  central asia as niche for latvia 
within eu foreign policy
•  Border management
•  higher education
Water management
condition 3 perceived capabilities perception of limited capabilities 
to ‘go it alone’ 
perception of limited  
capabilities to ‘go it alone’ 
condition 4 degree of top-down europeanization 
of national foreign policy
high degree of top-down  
europeanization
Medium degree of top-down 
europeanization
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than bilaterally. In doing so, the article started from the assumption that EU member states 
seek to project national preferences onto the EU level because bottom-up Europeanization 
can amplify their national foreign policy. At the same time, the national foreign policies 
of the member states manifest a strong tension between Europeanization and sovereign 
imperatives. This implies, among other things, that certain foreign policy actions continue 
to be conducted in parallel to or autonomously from EU policy.
The article found that the interests of Latvia and Romania in Central Asia are primarily 
security and economically related. Latvia, in particular, has strong interests in Central Asia 
and is increasingly eager to become more involved in the region. This is reflected in its 
growing engagement towards Central Asia at the EU level. While the article has also found 
evidence of Romanian attempts to project its interests in the region onto the EU level, Latvia 
appears to rely more extensively on the EU level to pursue its goals towards Central Asia 
and has strong ambitions to multiply its efforts to influence the EU’s policy. To explain this 
finding, we made reference to the four conditions presented in the theoretical part of the 
article, which indicate under which circumstances EU member states are likely to upload 
national preferences at the EU level. At the same time, the article also found that both Latvia 
and Romania are increasingly active in strengthening their bilateral ties with the Central 
Asian countries, in particular in the economic field. This confirms the claim by Hadfield 
et al. (2017) that member states experience a tension between Europeanization and the 
sovereign prerogative to construct their own foreign policy. Moreover, our analysis has 
shown that Latvia and Romania seek to participate in EU policy in those areas where they 
have specific expertise and where they lack the capacities and resources to ‘go it alone’. Given 
their limited resources to offer bilateral development and technical assistance, providing 
this expertise through the EU is perceived by them as being more advantageous.
To the (admittedly limited) extent that Latvia and Romania can be considered repre-
sentative for the larger group of new member states, and in particular those that were once 
part of either the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc, what can the findings tell us about the 
new member states as foreign policy actors involved in EU external policy-making?13 The 
findings are in line with existing research claiming that the participation of this group of 
member states in EU foreign and development policy is strongly – but not exclusively – 
guided by security motivations (see e.g., Baun and Marek 2013; Lightfoot 2010). Latvia and, 
to a lesser extent, Romania see Central Asia as a source of instability and security threats, 
which could directly or indirectly affect them. Latvia, in particular, has several security 
concerns relating to Central Asia. Apart from being concerned about possible destabilization 
spillover from Afghanistan, Latvia is witnessing increasing cases of drugs trafficking, human 
trafficking, organized crime and illegal migration all coming from Central Asia through 
Russia. Therefore, Latvia has a direct interest in improving border management and drugs 
control capacities in the region. However, the country has limited means to provide direct 
development and technical assistance to Central Asia. Therefore, it considers, and uses, the 
EU’s foreign and development policy towards the Central Asian countries as an instrument 
for pursuing its security-related goals vis-à-vis the region. In this regard, for instance, it sees 
the secondment of national border management specialists to the EU’s BOMCA programme 
in Central Asia as more advantageous than offering direct border management support to 
the region. These observations also reflect the broader debate on the interlinkages between 
security and development within the national foreign policies of the new member states 
and links up with the claim presented in a growing body of literature that the new member 
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states see development cooperation as a tool to achieve broader foreign and security policy 
aims rather than to reduce poverty as an end in itself (see e.g., Andrespok and Kasekamp 
2012; Szent-iványi 2012).
The findings also indicate that the new member states, and in particular, those that joined 
the EU in 2004, have ‘matured’ as policy entrepreneurs within EU foreign policy-making, in 
the sense that they increasingly seek to project their national foreign policy interests onto 
the EU level. In this regard, they have ‘watched and learned’ from the older member states, 
and now use the same tactics and strategies, taking full account of their perceived strengths 
and weaknesses. That said, as the bottom-up dimension of Europeanization remains under-
researched, especially from a theoretical perspective, further research is needed to theorize 
in a more systematic and rigid fashion under which conditions EU member states seek to 
project national foreign policy objectives onto the EU level.
A final remark that needs to be made regards the article’s reliance on an instrumental 
approach to Europeanization. This article has focused predominantly on how EU foreign 
policy is instrumentalized by the new member states to advance their national foreign policy. 
Further research should concentrate on the more sociological aspects of Europeanization of 
the new member states’ foreign policy towards Central Asia and beyond, including processes 
of socialization and identity change.
Notes
1.  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
2.  The EU depicts Central Asia as its ‘far neighbourhood’ (Spaiser 2015).
3.  It should be noted that in positivist case study research the goal of most-likely cases is dis-
confirmatory (see e.g., Gerring 2007). In the present article, which is explorative in nature, 
the goal is to explore – rather than ‘disconfirm’ – the expectation that Latvia and Romania 
will actively use the EU level in pursuit of their policy goals towards Central Asia.
4.  The small states literature defines a small state as a state that has a limited resource base, 
determined by factors such as geographical size, population size, economic weight, diplomatic 
network and military capabilities (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006, 653, 654).
5.  For more details on Latvia’s role in the NDN, see Andžāns (2013).
6.  Ventspils Grain Terminal, https://www.vgt.lv/eng/info.htm.
7.  Interestingly, Spaiser (2015) argues that the EU itself focuses on ‘niche’ areas of security that 
are not occupied by other external actors in Central Asia.
8.  Latvian Presidency, https://eu2015.lv/news/insights/2439-eu-central-asia-strategy-at-the-
crossroads-of-growth-in-two-continents.
9.  For an interesting piece on the EU’s interest in border management in Central Asia, see 
Martin-Mazé (2015).
10.  https://www.caep-project.org/riga2016/.
11.  TAIEX stands for ‘Technical Assistance and Information Exchange’. As a distinctive EU 
external assistance instrument, it provides support to public administrations regarding 
approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation as well as facilitating the sharing 
of EU best practices.
12.  See https://www.euwi.net/wg/eecca.
13.  Although the extent to which one can generalize based on this two-case comparison to the 
larger group of cases is limited, it is nevertheless relevant to reflect on what the findings 
might tell us about the new member states as foreign policy actors involved in EU external 
policy-making.
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